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The emotional responses elicited by the way options are framed often results in lack of logical consistency in human decisionmaking. In
this study, we investigated subjects with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) using a financial task in which the monetary prospects were
presented as either loss or gain.We report both behavioral evidence that ASD subjects show a reduced susceptibility to the framing effect
and psycho-physiological evidence that they fail to incorporate emotional context into the decision-making process. On this basis, we
suggest that this insensitivity to contextual frame, although enhancing choice consistency in ASD,may also underpin core deficits in this
disorder. These data highlight both benefits and costs arising frommultiple decision processes in human cognition.
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Introduction
Logical consistency across decisions, regardless of how choices
are presented, is a central tenet of rational choice theory and the
cornerstone of modern economic and political science (Luce and
Raiffa, 1957; Arrow, 1982). Empirical data challenge this perspec-
tive by showing that humans are highly susceptible to themanner
or context in which options are cast, resulting in a decision bias
termed the “framing effect” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). We
have previously shown that the amygdala mediates this framing
bias, a finding that highlights the importance of incorporating
emotional processes within models of human decision making
(De Martino et al., 2006; Kahneman and Frederick, 2007). An
ability to integrate emotional contextual information into the
decision process provides a useful heuristic in decision making
under uncertainty. This is a factor that is likely to assume consid-
erable importance during social interactions in which informa-
tion about others is often incomplete, ambiguous, and not easily
amenable to standard inferential reasoning processes.
In this study, we investigated the effect of contextual frame on
choice behavior of individuals with autistic spectrum disorder
(ASD) (see Fig. 1). Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder
characterized by deficits in social interaction, qualitative impair-
ments in communication, and repetitive and stereotyped pat-
terns of behavior, interests, and activities (Kanner, 1943; As-
perger, 1944). From Kanner’s earliest description, it has been
recognized that individuals with ASD have a strong tendency to
focus on parts rather than global aspects of objects of interest and
are unable to integrate disparate information into a meaningful
whole (weak central coherence theory) (Frith and Happe´, 1994;
Happe´ and Booth, 2008).
We previously proposed that susceptibility to a framing bias
reflects the operation of an affect heuristic (De Martino et al.,
2006; Kahneman and Frederick, 2007). Here, we show that indi-
viduals with ASD, a condition characterized by marked behav-
ioral inflexibility, demonstrate a decreased susceptibility to fram-
ing resulting in an unusual enhancement in logical consistency
that is paradoxically more in line with the normative prescrip-
tions of rationality at the core of the current economics theory
(Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Arrow, 1982). Furthermore, insensitivity
in these subjects to a contextual framing bias was associated with
a failure to express a differential autonomic response to contex-
tual cues as indexed in skin conductance responses (SCRs), a
standard measure of emotional processing. Our findings suggest
that amore consistent pattern of choice in the ASD group reflects
a failure to incorporate emotional cues into the decision process,
an enhanced economic “rationality” that may come at a cost of
reduced behavioral flexibility.
Materials andMethods
Subjects. Thirty-two subjects participated to the study, with 29 included
in the final analysis. Of these 32, three subjects were excluded: one subject
was found to be on antipsychotic drug treatment (Olanzapine) after
enrolment, one subject was unable to fully understand the task instruc-
tions, and a third was excluded because he was a statistical outlier (his
score on the framing effect was greater than two SD above the group
mean). Therefore, after exclusion, a total of 29 subjects were included in
the final analysis. Fourteen ASD subjects (10 male; mean age 34.8 7.9
years) were age and intelligence quotient (IQ) matched with 15 controls
(11 male; mean age 32.2  8.5 years). Of note, two subjects in the ASD
group were taking a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) anti-
depressant medication. These subjects were not excluded as we did not
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initially anticipate SSRIs to interfere with the cognitive abilities involved
in the task; however, because it has been reported that serotonin can
effect emotional processing (Canli and Lesch, 2007); we also repeated our
statistical comparison excluding these two subjects (see Results). All ASD
subjects were diagnosed using international classification of diseases-10
(ICD-10) criteria by specialized clinicians before inclusion (Table 1). An
additional subject (ASD group) was excluded from the SCR analysis,
attributable to technical failure. Subjects performed a framing financial
decision making task (see below, Experimental paradigm), previously
described inDeMartino et al. (2006). SCRwas recorded throughout data
acquisition.
The ASD group, comprising 10males and 4 females, had amean age of
34.8 years (SD,7.9 years) and amean full-scale IQ score of 112.1 13.5
(mean verbal IQ score, 112.6  11.6; and mean performance IQ score,
109.0  16.1). All ASD subjects had received a clinical diagnosis of au-
tism or ASD by a specialized clinician before inclusion. In addition, all
subjects had an independent autism diagnostic observation schedule
(ADOS) assessment to quantify the degree of impairment across the
domains of communication and reciprocal social interaction (Lord et al.,
2000). TheADOS is a research standardized test that provides an index of
autistic symptoms observed on a particular occasion. All subjects took
module 4 (designed to assess adults) and received two scores: (1) a com-
munication score (labeled “ADOS score 1” in Table 1) on which the ASD
cutoff is 2 and the autism cutoff is 4 and (2) a reciprocal interaction (or
“social”) score (labeled “ADOS score 2”) on which the ASD cutoff is 4
and the autism cutoff is 7. Overall, the total ADOS score cutoff for ASD is
7 and the cutoff for autism is 12. We note, however, that the ADOS
classification is not a clinical diagnosis (i.e., based on standardizedDSM-
IV/ICD-10) (Table 1) and, although it may contribute to diagnosis, can-
not replace full systematic assessment by a specialized clinician. For this
reason, one ASD subject (subject 24) had a clinical diagnosis of autism,
although scored below the ADOS cutoff for autism spectrum disorder.
The control group, comprising 11males and 4 females, had amean age
of 32.2 8.5 andmean full-scale IQ score of 116.5 7.7 (mean verbal IQ
score, 114.8 8.5;mean performance IQ score, 115.6 8.5). There were
no significant differences between the two groups in age ( p  0.41,
independent t test), full-scale IQ score ( p  0.29, independent t test),
verbal IQ score ( p 0.56, independent t test), or performance IQ score
( p 0.17, independent t test) (Table 1).
The study was conducted with the approval of the National Hospital
for Neurology and Neurosurgery and the Institute of Neurology Joint
Research Ethics Committee, London, UK.
Experimental paradigm. The experiment was divided into three parts:
an instruction phase, a task phase during which subjects performed the
task (during this phase SCRwas recorded), and a questionnaire phase. In
the instruction phase, subjects were familiarized with the decision-
making task and given a number of practice trials before starting the
main behavioral task.
The task was divided into three 17 min sessions. Each session com-
prised 96 trials (32 loss frame, 32 gain frame, and 32 catch trials) ordered
pseudorandomly. At the beginning of each trial, participants were shown
a message indicating the initial amount of money that they received to
play that trial (e.g., “you receive £50”) (2 s). Four different starting
amounts were used in the experiment: 25, 50, 75, and £100. Participants
were instructed that they would not be able to retain the whole of this
initial amount but would have to choose between a sure and a gamble
(risky) option (4 s).
In the gain frame trials, the sure optionwas presented as the amount of
money retained from the starting amount (e.g., “keep £20” from an
initial amount of £50) and in loss frame trials as the total amount of
Table 1. Details of participants
Sub # Group Age Gender V-IQ P-IQ F-IQ ADOS score1 ADOS score2 ADOS total score ADOS classification
1 ASD 52.77 M 134 122 132 3 4 7 Autism spectrum
2* ASD 28.23 M 105 90 99 4 7 11 Autism spectrum
3 ASD 29.85 F 104 100 103 4 5 9 Autism spectrum
4 ASD 30.42 F 100 80 91 5 12 17 Autism
5 ASD 22.86 M 112 99 107 4 8 12 Autism
6 ASD 32.7 M 119 125 124 3 7 10 Autism spectrum
7 ASD 42.43 M 123 107 117 4 4 8 Autism spectrum
8 ASD 39.13 M 95 104 99 4 6 10 Autism spectrum
9 ASD 34.86 M 100 102 101 2 6 8 Autism spectrum
10 ASD 29.62 M 125 119 125 3 4 7 Autism spectrum
11 ASD 35.64 F 114 116 116 4 10 14 Autism
12 C 24.17 F 105 113 109
13 C 25.76 M 134 114 128
14 C 32.46 M 103 117 110
15a ASD 28.59 M 112 89 102 4 6 10 Autism spectrum
16 ASD 24.7 M 124 125 128 3 6 9 Autism spectrum
17 C 38.68 M 112 111 112
18 C 53.14 M 105 113 109
19 ASD 30.15 M 102 84 94 2 5 7 Autism spectrum
20 C 32.25 F 114 110 113
21a C 41.36 M 91 102 95
22 C 23.54 M 125 136 134
23 C 27.87 M 122 121 123
24 ASD 44 M 112 107 110 1 2 3 None
25 C 24.79 M 111 111 112
26 ASD 38 F 112 136 123 3 8 11 Autism spectrum
27 C 28.21 F 108 105 107
28 C 29.2 M 120 110 118
29 C 30.22 M 112 130 122
30 C 40.84 M 122 109 117
31 C 43.45 F 111 110 111
32 C 28.66 M 118 124 122
C, Control; V-IQ, verbal-IQ score; P-IQ, performance IQ score; F-IQ, full-scale IQ score; M, male; F, female; ADOS score 1, communication score; ADOS score 2, reciprocal interaction score.
aExcluded (see Materials and Methods).
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money lost from the starting amount (e.g., “lose £30” froma total of £50).
The gamble option was identical for both frames and was represented by
a pie chart depicting the probability of winning and losing in green and
red, respectively (Fig. 1). Four different probabilities were used in the
experiment: 20, 40, 60, and 80%. All experimental variables (total start-
ing amount, percentage of the money offered, number of trials per ses-
sion) were fully counterbalanced between frame conditions. The ex-
pected value of the options were balanced in each trial (with the
exception of the catch trials, see below) and mathematically equivalent
between frames. For example, if participants initially received £50, they
were then required to choose between the options “keep £20” or a gamble
with a 40% chance of winning £50 and a 60% chance of winning nothing.
Participants were required to respond within 4 s by key press.
Given the equivalence of the choices in terms of expected outcomes,
we included “catch” trials (32 trials each session) to ensure that subjects
remained actively engaged in the decision-making task throughout the
course of the experiment. In these catch trials, in both frames, expected
outcomes for the sure and gamble option were markedly unbalanced: in
half of the trials (“gamble weighted”) the gamble option was preferable
(e.g., 95% probability of winning by taking the gamble option vs a sure
choice of 50%of the initial amount), and for the other half of trials (“sure
weighted”) the sure option was preferable (e.g., 5% probability of win-
ning by taking the gamble option vs a sure choice of 50% of the initial
amount). As in the main experimental trials, the catch trials were also
presented in either a gain or a loss frame.
Note that the behavioral task they were asked to performwas identical
to the one used in the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
experiment described by De Martino et al. (2006).
Behavioral data analysis. The behavioral data were analyzed using the
statistic software SPSS. The main effect of frame was calculated using a
mixedmeasures ANOVAwith frame (gain and loss) as the within subject
factor and group (ASD and control) as the between subject factor. Sig-
nificant main effects and interactions were then further analyzed using
paired and independent sample t tests. Effect of frame within each group
(i.e., ASD and control) was calculated as the percentage of trials in which
subjects chose the “gamble” option within each frame. The incorrect
catch trials responses (i.e., when the subject fails to chose the option with
the dominant expected value independently of the framing manipula-
tion) were analyzed using a two-sample (i.e., ASD and control) t test.
SCR data analysis. SCR was recorded using two Ag/AgCl electrodes
(skin conductance recorder, AT-64; Autogenic Systems Laboratory) at-
tached using surgical tape to the palmar surface of subjects distal phalan-
ges of the second and fourth fingers of the left hand (Dawson et al., 2000).
Conductive gel was applied between the skin and the electrodes. SCR
signal and event markers were sent to an analog-to-digital converter
(CED-Power1401) then recorded on two different channels using the
software Spike2 (v5; Cambridge Electronic Design).
Skin conductance responses and event markers were recorded at 100
Hz. The window of interest was defined as the 5 s after the subject’s
decision. Baseline skin conductance was calculated by averaging the skin
conductance level during the 0.5 s before the presentation of the task.
Amplitude of the SCR was defined as the difference between the time-
window peak value and the baseline. Attributable to technical failure,
skin conductance for one subject (ASD) was not recorded, and three
further subjects (total of two from each group) were subsequently ex-
cluded because of lack of physiological SCR responses [amplitude 2
microSiemens (S)]. All remaining SCRdatawere visually inspected and
nonphysiological SCR responses (10% of the entire data set) were re-
moved before further analysis. SCR responses to each trial were recorded
for each subject. Mean SCR and SD of SCR responses were then calcu-
lated and used to produce z-transformed SCR responses for each trial per
subject (Yaremko, 1986)
Z-transformed SCR results were then analyzed using a 2  2  2
mixed-measures ANOVA with within-subject factors of frame (loss
frame, gain frame) and choice (risky choice, sure choice), group (ASD,
control) was the between-subject factor.
Results
In accordance with our previously reported findings, all control
subjects manifest susceptibility to the framing effect, reflected in
an increased disposition to gamble in loss compared with gain
frames (mean, 14.24  1.68%). This susceptibility to the frame
manipulation was markedly reduced in the ASD group (mean,
7.66 1.95%) (Fig. 2A). The significance of this effect was con-
firmed in an interaction analysis showing that the ASD subjects
were significantly more consistent (i.e., less influenced by the
frame) in their pattern of choice compared with controls
[ANOVA; group (ASD, control)  frame (gain, loss); F(1,27) 
6.56, p 0.02].
TheASDgroup also showedmild risk aversion comparedwith
controls evidenced in a trend level main effect of group (F(1,27)
3.91, p 0.058) (Fig. 2B). To ensure that our findings were not
driven by greater risk aversion in the ASD group, we repeated the
ANOVA with individual risk tendency (calculated as percentage
of risky choices independently of frame) as a covariate. This anal-
ysis corroborated our previous findings [ANOVA; group (ASD,
control)  frame (gain, loss); F(1,26)  10.03, p  0.005] by
showing that the ASD group was significantly less affected by the
framing decision bias even after controlling for differences in
absolute risk attitude. This result held even after reducing the size
of the ASD group (see Materials and Methods) by excluding the
two ASD subjects taking SSRI medication [ANOVA; group
(ASD, control) frame (gain, loss); F(1,25) 5.04, p 0.02].
To control that the ASD subjects were fully engaged in the task
andwere responding tomonetary incentives similarly to the con-
trol group, we analyzed the performance in the catch trials re-
sponse (see Materials and Methods) by two-tailed paired t test.
Figure 1. Task. Participants were shown a message indicating the amount of money re-
ceived to play in that trial (e.g., “you receive £50”). Subjects then had to choose between a
“sure” or a “gamble” option presented in the context of two different “frames.” The “sure”
optionwas formulated as either the amount ofmoney retained from the initial starting amount
(e.g., keep £20 of a total of £50-gain frame) or as the amount of money lost from the initial
amount (e.g., lose £30 of a total of £50-loss frame). The “gamble” option was identical in both
frames and represented as a pie chart depicting the probability of winning or losing.
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This statistical comparison did not show significant difference
between the two groups (t(27) 1.8, p 0.09). Furthermore, in
light of a possible trend level effect, we additionally ensured that
the individual performance on catch trials did not impact on the
main conclusion by repeating our critical statistical comparison
[ANOVA; group (ASD, control)  frame (gain, loss); F(1,27) 
7.23, p  0.02] covarying out individual performance on the
catch trials; as can be seen, our main effect remained significant.
Acquisition of subjects’ SCRs, while they performed the task,
enabled us to obtain an on-line measurement of their autonomic
responses to the framing manipulation. Analysis of these data
revealed that the ASD group showed a higher absolute SCR re-
sponse for each frame (gain frame, 0.72  0.14 S; loss frame,
0.70  0.12 S) compared with the control group (gain frame,
0.47 0.15S; loss frame, 0.54 0.18S), probably attributable
to increased anxiety. However, the ASD individuals critically
showed a lack of a differential response to
the frame manipulation. In fact, although
loss and gain frames induced differential
skin conductance responses in controls
(t(12) 3.19, p 0.01, paired t test), SCR
did not differentiate between frames in the
ASD group (t(11) 0.96, p 0.36, paired t
test) (Fig. 3). These results were again cor-
roborated by a significant two-way inter-
action (frame; group; F(1,23)  4.86, p 
0.05) but nomain effect of group (F(1,23)
0.8, p  0.46) in a 2  2  2 ANOVA
(group, frame, choice). These data further
support our contention that ASD subjects,
although having an absolute emotional re-
sponse, crucially fail to differentially en-
gage emotional processes in response to
the framing manipulation.
Discussion
These findings suggest the ASD group fail
to integrate emotional contextual cues
into the decision-making process. This is
evident both in a reduced behavioral sus-
ceptibility of a framing effect and an ab-
sence of a differential SCR response to our contextual manipula-
tion. The concept that ASD individuals fail to integrate
information across cognitive domains also informs the sugges-
tion that an uneven profile of abilities and deficiencies in autistic
individuals may reveal an imbalance in empathizing and system-
izing behaviors (Baron-Cohen and Belmonte, 2005).
Our SCR results in the context of a high-level decision task
supports convergent evidence of impairment in emotional pro-
cessing in autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Adolphs, 2002).
Paradoxically, although this impairment in processing contex-
tual emotional information protects ASD subjects from the fram-
ing bias, leading tomore consistent behavior in situations of risk,
it may come at a cost of the social, emotional, and behavioral
deficits that characterize the condition.
Recent theoretical accounts of decision making have put for-
ward a “two-systems” model of human judgment (Evans, 2003).
This view proposes that human decisionmaking arises through a
combination of intuitive and analytic processes. This model pro-
poses that intuitive reasoning is rapid and capable of processing
large amounts of information in parallel; however, it is prone to
mistakes and strongly influenced by contextual emotional infor-
mation (Kahneman, 2003). In contrast, analytical reasoning is
more accurate but slow and computationally demanding. Ac-
cording to this view, the framing bias reflects an affect heuristic by
which normal individuals incorporate a potentially broad range
of additional emotional information into the decision process. In
evolutionary terms, this mechanism may confer a strong advan-
tage because such contextual cues may carry useful, even critical,
information that dictates a rapid response. We propose that this
ability is particularly crucial in a social context in that subtle
contextual cues communicate knowledge elements (possibly un-
conscious) that allow optimal decisions to be made in uncertain
environments (Stanovich and West, 2002).
In the context of the “two-systems”model of decisionmaking
described above, these results suggest that ASD individuals have
an increased tendency toward the analytic type of decision mak-
ing, attributable to impairment within their intuitive reasoning
mechanisms. This interpretation would also support the
Figure 3. SCR data. Mean difference in SCR amplitude inS to the loss versus gain frame in
each group. Control group (0.071S;0.026S) and ASD group (0.019S;0.034S)
showing loss of differential SCR response to the framing manipulation in the ASD group com-
pared with controls [ANOVA (group, frame, choice); F(1,23) 4.86, p 0.05].
Figure2. Behavioral data.A, Summary of the susceptibility of subjects to the framingmanipulation (mean SE) calculated as
a percentage of increased gambling in the loss frame compared with the gain frame. The susceptibility to the framing manipu-
lation is significantly reduced in the ASD group (mean, 7.66 1.95%) comparedwith the control group (mean, 14.24 1.68%)
[ANOVA; group (ASD, control) frame (gain, loss); F(1,27)10.03,p0.005].B, Percentageof trials inwhich subjects chose the
risky option rather than the sure option for both framemanipulations: in the control group, subjects gambled in 43.75% (4.72)
of the trials in the gain frame and 57.99% (4.70) of the trials in the loss framewhereas in the ASD group the percentages were
respectively 34.52% (4.99) and 42.19% (3.64). A group (ASD, control) frame (gain, loss) 2 2 ANOVA yielded a highly
significant main effect of frame (F(1,27) 72.83, p 0.0001) in accordance with framing effect manipulation (increase in risk in
loss frame compared with the gain frame). The critical two-way interaction (group, frame) yielded a significant result (F(1,27)
6.56, p 0.02), supporting our hypothesis that ASD subjects have a significantly reduced susceptibility to the framing manipu-
lation comparedwith the control group.Notably, theASDgroup showedamild risk aversion comparedwith controls evidencedby
trend level main effect of group (F(1,27) 3.91, p 0.058).
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empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory of autism (Baron-Cohen
and Belmonte, 2005). The E-S theory proposes that the imbal-
ance between analytic and empathic behavior underlies both the
impairment in social skills in ASD and their enhanced analytical
skills. During the framing task, ASD subjects were better able to
ignore biasing contextual information and isolate the critical in-
formation about the numerical value of the sure and risky op-
tions. This result is consistent with other experimental findings
showing that ASD have enhanced attention for the task’s details
but reduced capacity to deal with the global aspect of the task as
predicted by weak coherence theory (Frith and Happe´, 1994).
In a previous fMRI study (DeMartino et al., 2006; Kahneman
and Frederick, 2007), we showed that the engagement of an
amygdala-based emotional system played a key role in underpin-
ning a framing effect. These previous results, combined with the
SCR data shown here, suggest that the failure to assign emotional
salience to contextual cues and consequential lack of behavioral
bias in ASD may result from an amygdala based mechanism. A
wealth of empirical data supports this hypothesis. First, his-
topathological abnormalities of the amygdala such as an in-
creased cell density and a reduced dendritic arborization have
been described in autism (Bauman and Kemper, 1994). Moreover,
Howard et al. (2000) suggested that persons with high-functioning
autism showed a similar neuropsychological profile to that seen in
patients with amygdala lesions, particularly a selective impairment
in the recognition of facial expressions of fear. Last, several imaging
studies demonstrate blunted activationof the amygdala inASDdur-
ing tasks which involved processing of facial expressions (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2000; Critchley et al., 2000).
An ability to incorporate a broad range of contextual cues into
the decision process endows humans with a clear evolutionary
advantage. This requirement becomes particularly acute when
making decisions in social environments inwhichmultiple subtle
contextual cues carry critical information. We suggest that com-
petence in dealingwith social uncertainty involves deployment of
affect heuristics. In ASD, a reduction of framing effect might
explain both enhanced analytic and impoverished social abilities,
the latter reflecting an inability to deploy an affect heuristic in
complex and uncertain social contexts. Thus, our findings sug-
gest a potential core neurobiological deficit inASDand also speak
to limits, and trade-offs, in human rationality.
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